THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, THE SAFEGUARD OF FREE INSTITUTIONS by HORNBLOWER, WILLIAM B.
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
VI, XXII NOVEMBER, 1912 No. I
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, THE
SAFEGUARD OF FREE INSTITUTIONS
Address to the Graduating Class of the Yale Law School, Jue
7, 191:, 1y William B. Hornblower, of New York.
In choosing a subject for this address, I have been tempted to
take some academic topic such as the relative merits and demerits
of the common law system of jurisprudence "broadening out
from precedent to precedent" as compared with statutory law
rlgdly embodied in codes, or the relative merits and demerits of
combination js compared with competition in trade and commerce
and the merits and demerits of statutory regulations on- such
subjects.
There are, however, certain burning questions of the day affect-
ing the independence and the integrity of our judicial system on
which I feel It to be the duty of every lAwyer to speak out with
all the force and emphasis at hi5 command and which I do not
feel at liberty to ignore.
To evade or to ignore these questions would he to be recreant
to my-profespiongl duty, When the integrity and independenee
of the judiciary are at stake, all other qgestions become unim-
portant.
When the gappers and miners are at work undermining the
foundationi of our judicial structure, it is idle to discuss questions
6f detail of congtruttion- or reconstruction- of the edifice.
The young men just graduating from our law schools find
themselves confronted by a most serious situation. They find
the courts subjected to attack and exposed to peril. The rising
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generation of lawyers gre called upon to resist this attack and to
defend the courts from this peril. As officers of the courts sworn
to support the Constitution of the United States and of the State,
and to faithfully discharge their duties as attorneys and counsel-
lors at law, it becomes their duty to see that no harm comes to
the administration of the law, or to the usefulness or the prestige
of the courts, and that no harm comes to the commonwealth
through this attack on the courts and the law.
Tht air is rent by the clamor of those who are crying out for
what is known as judicial recall.
This is no longer an academic question. Three at least of our
States have already embodied it in their Constitutions. Agita-
tion in favor of extending this so-called reform to other States
has been and is being actively carried on. Advocates of the
recall are fouand even in the ranks of our own profession.
The self-styled Progressive is not necessarily the true Progress-
ive. He may be a reactiopary Qf the worst kind. To set back
the clocpk of time is not progress but regress. Civilization rests
upon law. Law rests upon the courts. The courts rest ppon
pop l4r r@Spect. If for law and for the cgurts are to be substi-
tuted the voice of a temporary majority of the people, then are we
pro tanhtp abandoning the achievements of civilization and drift-
ing back to barbarism.
Ciyilization consists in subordinating the wishes of the major-
ity-to the rights of the minority. Slowly and carefully and pain-
fully have the ideals of civilization been built up. Every now
and then we are called. upon to contend with an outburst of
primeval passion in the shape of lynch law. The spirit of lynch
law may be manifested in attacks on the individual citizen or in
attacks on the courts themselves. In this country our fathers
deyjid _feguards of the rights of a minority against the tem-
pornqry yhims of the majority by imposing constitutional limita-
tJop§ tlpn legj§lative authority. The judiciary has by its dutyto ,dmij~ter iqd 0 e tlse constitutior.1 limitations and to
reftl§@ t9 pforce unconstitutional legislation become the defender
Of ths§ fpnda nental right4 of the Minority.
I1t § glways been thp boast of our An~go Saxon republic that
we are g cmmon sense people; that extreme theories- have no
charm for us; that we do not fall in love with mere phrases or
catch-words. The conservatism of our people has been pro-
verbial. The bar of this country has been the guiding force
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which has kept the popular ideals from running after strange
gods.,
The question now confronts us, are the old ideals to be aban-
doned? Are we to continue to be a government of law admin-
istered by the courts, or are we to become a government of agita-
tors by whom law and the courts are only to be tolerated so long
as the law and the courts are in accord with the popular wishes
of the moment? These are grave questions going to the very
root of our system of government.
Of course, the proposition for recall of judges is not immi-
nently threatening in those States where the judges are not as
yet elected by popular vote. In Connecticut, in Massachusetts
and in New Jersey, for instance, where the judges are appointed
by the Governor or the Legislature, there is no force in the a priori
argument that a judge elected by the people should be immediately
and directly responsible to and removable by the people. The
spirit of antagohism to judicial independence, however, unless
checked, will inevitably spread to the States where the judiciary
is non-elective. Members of the bar in all the States are thus
vitally interested in resisting the propaganda for recall of judges.
As to the question of the recall of judges during their term of
office, the question is to be considered under various aspects.
First, as to its effect upon the personnel and character of the
judges themselves. Secondly, as to its effect upon the rights of
individual litigants. Thirdly, as to its effect upon the principles
of the law. Fourthly, as to its effect upon the rights of the
public.
The aspects of the question in each of these particulars need
to be separately considered. They are, however, in the popular
discussion of the subject continually confused.
FIRST, as to the effect upon the personnel and character of the
judges themselves.
It is urged that men are frequently chosen for the bench who
are incompetent, inefficient or even corrupt; that the remedy by
impeachment for the removal of a judge found to be incompetent,
inefficient or corrupt is grossly inadequate; that where a judge is
found to be -incompetent, inefficient -or corrupt, the -people -whose
servant he- is should have the right -to summarily remove him
without the formality of a trial and to substitute in his place a
better man. This sounds plausible, but to any one who is familiar
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with the working of our judicial system, the fallacy of this argu-
ment will be apparent if he stops to give it full consideration.
So far as concerns the question of incompetency or inefficiency
this is a matter for difference of opinion. What constitutes incom-
petency or inefficiency? Every defeated litigant considers the
judge who decides against him to be incompetent and inefficient,
and in this opinion he is frequently encouraged by his counsel
who is temporarily smarting under what he considers an unde-
served defeat. The question of the competency or efficiency of
a judge is one to be determined by a careful consideration of his
judicial decisions as a whole. To have the question of the com-
petency or efficiency of a judge passed upon by popular vote is as
irrational as it would be to have the competency or efficiency of a
physician passed upon by popular vote. How are the people to
determine whether the judge whose recall is proposed is really
inefficient or incompetent? It is easy to allege inefficiency or
incompetency, but opinions will differ as to whether a particular
judge is or is not inefficient or incompetent.
When we come to the question of corruption, the injustice of
having such charges passed upon by popular vote after a heated
campaign with violent harangues by popular orators without any
legal proof of the charges, is manifest. To have the honesty or
dishonesty of a judge determined by the effect of stump speeches
upon the platform, by loose declamations and unsworn statements
of interested parties without any opportunity for careful exam-
ination, is to subject a judge to an indignity and a possible injus-
tice which may blast his reputation for a lifetime. How often
have we heard disgruntled clients, or even indignant lawyers,
complain that a judge has been bought or improperly influenced
to render adverse decisions when we are confident that such
charges are absolutely unfounded, and are the product of an over-
heated imagination resulting from the bitterness of defeat in a
hard-fought litigation!
The recall will furnish a ready weapon for party warfare upon
the judges. Republican judges may be voted out and Democratic
judges voted in and vice versa, whenever the shifting popular
majority shall change from one party to the other.
Certainly as a method of improving the personnel of the judges,
the method of subjecting them to the indignity of a recall when-
ever any defeated litigant can persuade a majority of the vQters
that a judge is incompetent or inefficient or corrupt is the-worst
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possible method. To force a judge against whom such charges
are made to take the stump and defend himself. in public while
still on the bench would make his position as a judge intolerable
to himself and worse than useless to the public.
It is difficult enough already, especially in our larger cities, to
induce the ablest and most successful members of the bar to
forego the honors and pecuniary rewards of the bar for the labors
and the smaller compensation of the bench. If the position of
the judge is to become subject to the indignity of a possible recall,
it is hard to see what inducement there would be to a successful
practitioner to incur the risk of such indignity.
Moreover, the futility of the scheme for judicial recall as a
remedy for existing evils, real or imaginary, is apparent. The
advocates of recall overlook the fact that the successors of these
incompetent, inefficient or corrupt judges are to be selected by
the voters of the very same constituency which is responsible for
the election of the incompetent or inefficient or corrupt men who
are to be recalled, and the identical political bosses, or conventions,
or primaries, which selected the recalled judges are to select their
successors. We are thus traveling in a vicious circle. Elect
incompetent, inefficient or corrupt men, recall them and elect others
in their place to be again recalled and others again to be elected
in their place by the same constituency and the same methods
SECONDLY, as to the effect of recall upon the rights of individual
litigants.
It needs no prophet to foresee what the effect might be upon
the mind of the judge where on the one side was a litigant -with
powerful political influence, and on the other side an individual
contending for his rights against such influence. So where an
individual is contending for his rights or his alleged rights against
the interests or supposed interests of the community in which he
lives, or against a strong popular prejudice, how can any but an
exceptionally strongminded judge be expected to hold the scales
of justice even? Our ideal of a judge as we have heretofore
understood it is that of a judge absolutely fearless, knowing no
friend or foe, knowing neither majority nor minority, knowing
neither rich nor poor, fearing no man and no body of men. We
have heretofore endeavored to cultivate this ideal by giving a
judge a fixed term of office during which he can be removed only
for cause and after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense
by a competent tribunal. If we substitute for this ideal a judge
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vdwo may at any moment be recalled by reason of an unpopular
decision, the tendency is to have a judge constantly listening-for a
Wave. of public opinion with his "ear to the ground!" or eager to
curry favor with the bosses who control the nominations and who
can incite the voters to the exercise of their power of recall. I
do not mean of course to say that every judge would be of this
character or that the standard of judicial independence and integ-
rity-would be immediately disturbed, but I do say that the ten-
dency. and the constantly accelerating tendency would be to sub-
stitute for the fearless and.independent judge a spineless,, flabby,
cowardly judge, a reed shaken by the wind.
In the interests of the individual litigant, therefore, we should
protest against this change in our judicial system.
THiRDLY: As to the effect of judicial recall upon the principles
of the law.
It is to be borne in mind that our common law system of juris-
prudence is founded upon the courts. The courts not only
administer the law, but declare the law. Indeed it may be said
that the law is what the courts declare it to be. And this is- true,
even where statutes are concerned, since statutes have to be inter-
preted -and enforced by the courts. If the system of judicial
recall is to be adopted, it would necessarily be applied not -only to
the- judges of the inferior courts of nisi prius, but to the judges
of -the Appellate Courts as well whose duty it is to declare those
general principles which are to govern the nisi prius courts in the
practical administration of the law. It is essential to the orderly
development of our jurisprudence that the judges of our various
courts of last resort should be encouraged by the- tenure of their
office, and the surroundings of their position to exercise a calm
and broad judgment in- the disposition of the .ithportant questions
coming before them for determination, and that they should be
guided by the well considered precedents of the past as inter-
preted by what the Supreme Court of the United States has
called "the rule of reason." How can it be expected that the
orderly administration of the law by our highest courts of our
various states and the harmonious development of our jurispru-
dence can be maintained if a judge of the highest court of the
State is obliged to answer at any time to a popular agitation for
his recall, based upon some judicial decision in which he has par-
ticipated? A judge of the highest court of the State who.e
judicial labors might be interrupted at any moment by such a con-
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tingency would cease to be an exponent of the principles of law
and would rapidly tend to become a respecter of persons, of -par-
ties, of politicians and of the temporary majority of the voters.
FOURTHLY: As to the effect of judicial recall upon the rights- of
the public.
The public is entitled to the free and untrammeled exercise by
the judges of the functions for which they are put in office. If
instead of devoting their entire time to the performance of their
public duties, the judges are liable to be called aside from time to
time to conduct a political campaign in defense of their own
conduct upon the bench, to that e.ktent the public is deprived-of
the services for which they have placed the judges upon the bench.
The spectacle of our judges instead of earning their salaries
by persistent attention to their judicial duties spending their time
and their salaries in racing up and down their judicial districts-
haranguing the multitude in defense of their judicial conduct is
such a perversion of all judicial proprieties that only the comic
opera stage and the genius of Gilbert and Sullivan are adequate
to do justice to the situation. It must be borne in mind that
the better the-judge and the longer he serves upon the bench the
less facile does he become in the arts of public speaking and -the
more helpless does he become to meet- the specious, adroit, plausi-
ble, unscrupulous- and malicious demagogues who may come for-
ward upon the stump to attack him. Indeed to a sensitive;-high-
minded, upright judge nothing could be more revolting than to be
forced into a campaign in the midst of his term of office to pre-
vent his recall and to be compelled to choose the alternative of
letting the campaign go by default while he, quietly and labor-
iously, goes on with his judicial work or of matching his powers
of public address against the noisy and glib vituperation- -of- tie
stump- orator, whose powers- of reasoning are usually .in inverse
ratio to his powers of vigorous denunciation.
The judges' principal function is after all to protect the rights
of the-minority against the majority. The public is vitally inter-
ested in preserving intact this function. The majority of to-lay
may become the minority of to-miorrow.
We hear- it said constantly nowadays that the reason for this
agitation for judicial recall, and for the apparent strength of the
agitation among the people, is the inefficiency of the judicial sys-
tem as it now exists; in other words, that there are so many
inefficient and incompetent judges upon the bench, that the public
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mind has become impatient and demands some effective method
of repudiating them. I have already pointed out, however, that
where our judges are elected by the people, the remedy by recall
will be absurdly ineffective. We are quite as likely to have suc-
cessors who will be equally inefficient or incompetent as the judges
who are recalled.
But is it said that our entire administration of justice in this
country is full of technicalities and delays, and that this consti-
tutes an excuse, if not a justification, for the present distrust of
the judiciary and the present agitation for some such rough and
ready remedy as judicial recall. It must of course be admitted
that many of the criticisms of our judicial system and of the
administration of justice are well taken. I do not admit, how-
ever, that there is any special force in these objections when
directed against the courts of the present day, as compared with
the courts of any previous date. Indeed I am inclined to think
that the courts of to-day are less technical and less disposed to
sacrifice substance to form and to sacrifice justice to methods of
practice, than at any previous period in the history of our country.
Comparisons between the methods of administering justice in
this country, and those which are prevalent in England are mis-
leading. Extreme instances are cited from one or another of
our forty-eight States, and these extreme instances are compared
with the average course of justice in Great Britain. If, however,
we take the States by themselves and compare one with another,
and compare the generality of the States with the courts of Great
Britain, we should find a very different story.
The bench and bar of to-day are, I venture to say, keenly alive
to the importance and necessity of revising and simplifying our
methods of procedure.. -In my own State the legislature has at
its last session directed the Board of Statutory Consolidation, of
which I am one of the.members, to report a plan to the -legislature
at.its next session for the simplification of our procedure, which
has become by successive attempts at reform, and -successive
codes of procedure. and codes of civil procedure, a complicated
and voluminous practice Act of Brobdignagian proportions. But
I am unable to see-and cannot concede that the discontent with the
present -methods of practice is the real ground for the-popilar
agitation against the courts and the judges. The people as a
whole are but little affected- by the delays or difficulties caused by
technical. procedure, Indeed they know little or nothing of these
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things by experience. Their real grievances are caused by par-
ticular acts of particular judges in particular cases which are
made the basis of inflammatory attacks by agitators, and which
are supposed, to be against the interests of the people or of some
class of the people. So far as concerns the grievances growing out of
technicalities or the cumbersome administration of the law, judi-
cial recall would be worse than futile, since the -individual judge
is not responsible for the cumbersome provisions of practice acts,
but the legislatures who have adopted them. It is not the indi-
vidual judge who is to be attacked, but the whole body of judges
and the legislature which enacts the law under which the judges
are required to administer their offices.
Let us not deceive ourselves or live in a "fools' paradise".
The real ground of popular unrest and discontent with the
courts is the feeling that courts are too much inclined to favor
vested rights of property rather than personal liberty. There is
a restiveness at constitutional restraints which finds vent in the
demand for judicial recall and recall of judicial decisions.
Yet it is precisely by the enforcement of those constitutional
restraints that personal liberty is to be preserved.
"Due process of law" is the protection not only of "property"
but of "life and liberty as well." "Life, liberty and property"
are not to be taken away, says the constitutional prohibition "with-
out due process of law."
Weaken the power of the courts to protect "property" and you
necessarily weaken the power to protect life and "liberty" against
unconstitutional encroachments.
It behooves every lawyer who loves his country to bestir him-
self and to appeal to that American respect for law and regard for
the Constitution and that wholesome American contempt for the
visionary theorist and the wily agitator which have hitherto pre-
served our liberties from destruction.
I have hitherto spoken of judicial recall. What about the
so-called "recall" of judicial decisions? This is a scheme lately
devised by an ex-President of the United States. By the later
interpretation placed upon it by its author it is narrowed down to
a very limited class of cases. It is not every decision which is,
to be recalled by popular vote but only special classes of decisions.
Indeed the decision itself is not to be revoked so far as concerns
the individual litigants with regard to whom the decision was had,
but the principle announced by the decision. The scheme as at
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present formulated by its author, as I understand it, is this:
Whenever the highest court of a State shall have declared uncon-
stitutional a particular statute of the State passed under the
"police power" of the State for the supposed benefit of the health
or welfare or safety of a portion of the community, and when-
ever such statute has been held by the highest court of the State
to be unconstitutional because interfering with the life, liberty and
property clause of the constitution of the State, the people of the
State shall have the right by a majority vote to set aside the
decision of the court declaring the statute to be void and to restore
the authority of the statute by plebiscite.
As thus restricted, the principle leaves unimpaired the power
of the highest court of the land, a court by the way composed
entirely of judges not elected by the people at all, but appointed by
the executive with the consent of the Senate and not removable
by the people but only removable by impeachment, and holding
office for life or good behavior, to do the very things which the
State courts are to be prohibited from doing, viz.: to set aside
absolutely and without any right of review, a statute of a State
passed under the police power of the State for the protection of
the life, health or safety of a portion of the community.
If it be said that a statute approved by the State court is hardly
likely to be set aside by the United States Supreme Court, we can
point to numerous cases where this has been done.
Thus in the famous bake-shop case of People v. Lochner, 177
N. Y., 145, the Court of Appeals of Xew York affirmed the con-
stitutionality of a law limiting the hours of labor of employes in
bakeries and held it to be a valid exercise of the police power of
the legislature relating to the public health. This decision was
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States (198 U. S.,
45), which court held the act to be unconstitutional, as an unrea-
sonable interference with the liberty of the citizen.
The number of cases is legion where State statutes which have
been upheld by the State courts have been set aside by the United
States Supreme Court as violating the clause of the Federal Con-
stitution forbidding a State to pass any law impairing the obliga-
tion of a contract.
I-low long will it be before some future agitator clamoring for
the right of the people to rule will insist that the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court itself shall be made subject to
review by popular vote? The Federal Courts have been in the
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past subjected to the fiercest attacks by political agitators and have
been regarded with far more disfavor than the State courts. Only
recently, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
applying the "rule of reason" to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and
in applying to that act a "reasonable construction" have aroused
the anger of a large number of extremists.
The attack on the right of the courts to declare an act of the
legislature or of Congress unconstitutional is but a recrudescence
of an attack which has been from time to time waged upon the
courts ever since the foundation of our Federal government. It
has, indeed, been from time to time openly asserted and claimed
that the courts have usurped a power not originally conferred upon
them by the Constitutions. State or Federal, and not within the
original intention or purview of the framers of the Constitutions.
This proposition has even received support and encouragement
from some of our best known writers on academic questions of
constitutional law and even from professors in our law schools.
It may not be unnecessary, therefore, to remind ourselves of the
fallacy of this proposition.
So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned the debates in
the convention and the statements in the Federalist clearly show
that the power and duty of the courts to declare an act of Con-
gress or an act of the legislature void as unconstitutional was con-
templated.
In the Convention which framed the Federal Constitution, it
was proposed to create a "council of revision" to be composed of
the executive and a convenient number of the national judiciary,
with authority to examine every act before it shall operate with
a qualified veto power. ''his proposition was, however, rejected.
In the course of the debate, the provision for making the judi-
ciary a part of the Council of Revision was objected to on the
ground among others that it would interfere with their freedom
from bias when later called upon to expound the law.
On this point, .Mr. Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, said he
doubted whether the judiciary "ought to form a part of it, as they
will have a sufficient check against encroachments on their own
department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a
power of deciding on their constitutionality. In some States the
judges had actually set aside laws as being against the Constitu-
tion. This was done, too. with general approbation." Madi-
son's Journal of the Federal Convention (Scott's Ed., Chicago,
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Albert Scott & Co., 1893), p. 101. Mr. Gerry moved a proposi-
tion to give the veto power to the executive alone. Mr. Rufus
King, of Massachusetts, seconded the motion "observing that the
judges ought to be able to expound the law, as it should come
before them, free from the bias of having participated in its
formation." (Ibid., pp. ioi and io2.)
Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention, Vol I.,
PP. 97, 98.
Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania assumed that the judges as expos-
itors of the laws would have power to refuse to give effect to laws
clearly unconstitutional (Ibid., p. 398).
Mr. Luther Martin of Maryland considered that the association
of the judges with the executive would be a dangerous innovation.
"As to the constitutionality of laws, that point will, come before
the judges in their proper official character. In this character
they have a negative on the laws. Join them with the executive
in the revision and they will have a double negative." (Ibid., p.
402.)
Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention, Vol. II.,
p. 76.
There were, it is true, some members of the convention who
protested against conferring upon the judiciary the right to refuse
to enforce unconstitutional statutes; but their protests only serve
to emphasize the views of those who assumed that the judiciary
would of necessity be called upon to pass upon the constitution-
ality of statutes, State and Federal.
That the power and duty of the courts to pass upon the con-
stitutionality of statutes was contemplated and intended by the
framers of the Federal Constitution is made plain by the state-
ments of the Federalist.
In No. LXXVIII of the Federalist, is is said: "The complete
independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a
limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand
one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative
authority, such for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attain-
der, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind
can be preserved in practice no other way than through the
medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all
acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.
Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges
would amount to nothing. * * *
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"The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar prov-
ince of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be
regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If
there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the
two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of
course, to be preferred; or in other words, the Constitution ought
to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the
intention of their agents.
"Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority
of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the
power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will
of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to
that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought
to be governed by the latter rather than the former. * * *
"If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bul-
warks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments,
this consideration will afford a strong argument for the perma-
nent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so
much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must
be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those
ill-humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in
the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the govern-
ment, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the com-
munity."
Human language could not be more explicit than this. The
Federalist was, as we all know, published as an appeal by Madi-
son, Hamilton and Jay to the American people for the adoption of
the Constitution. That the adoption of the Constitution by the
various States was due to the lucid and forcible exposition of its
principles in the Federalist has been universally conceded. It
follows that when the Constitution was adopted, it was adopted
with explicit notification that the courts were intended to have
the power to declare statutes unconstitutional.
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I am quite at a loss to understand the state of mind of those
who talk about "judicial usurpation" in passing upon the consti-
tutionality of statutes. It would clearly have been judicial
breach of duty if the courts had failed to exercise the function
thus clearly imposed upon them.'
Indeed, the duty of a court to refuse to enforce an act which
violates a provision of the Constitution is perfectly obvious when
we reflect upon the nature and objects of constitutional restric-
tions upon legislative authority.
As the matter was forcibly stated by Chief Justice Iarshall
in the great epoch-making case of Marbitry v. Madison, I Cranch's
Reports, 137-18o: "If two laws conflict with each other the courts
must decide on the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposi-
tion to the Constitution; if both the law and the Constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or
conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.
This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts
are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is sup.erior to
any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution and not such
ordinary act, must -govern the case to which they both apply.
Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is
to be considered in court as a paramount law are reduced to the
necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the
Constitution and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert
the very foundation of all written Constitutions. It would
declare that an act which, according to the principles and theory
of our government, is entirely void is, yet, in practice, completely
obligatory. It would declare that, if the legislature shall do what
is expressly forbidden, .such act, notwithstanding the express pro-
hibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legis-
lature a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath
which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It
is prescribing limits and declaring that these limits may be passed
at pleasure."
I The evidence on this subject is very clearly set forth in an able and
thorough article by Prof. C. A. Beard in the "Political Science Quarterly"
entitled "The Supreme Court-Usurper or Grantee?" which was called to
my attention after I had completed the first draft of this address ("Political
Science Quarterly," March, 1912, Vol. XXVII., Number 1).
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So unanswerable was the logic of the Chief-Justice's opinion
that although it was really but an obiter dictum, the decision of the
Court being that they had no jurisdiction of the particular matter
before them, being an application for an original writ of man-
damus, not in aid of their appellate jurisdiction, the application
for the writ being discharged,-yet it became the foundation stone
on which was built up the vast structure of constitutional juris-
prudence, state and national, in this country. This structure has
stood finn, from that day to this, notwithstanding the assaults of
would-be innovators and the criticisms of academic theorists.
In George Ticknor Curtis's Constitutional'History of the United
States (Vol. I., p. 593), the subject is very forcibly put as fol-
lows: "To withhold from the citizen a right to be heard upon
the question which in our jurisprudence is called the constitution-
ality of a law when that law is supposed to govern his rights or
prescribe his duties, would be as unjust as it would be to deprive
him of the right to be heard upon the construction of the law. or
upon any other legal question that arises in the cause. The
citizen lives under the protection, and is subject to the require-
ments, of a written fundamental law. No department of the
national, or of any state government, can lawfully act otherwise
than according to the powers conferred or the restrictions imposed
by that instrument. If the citizen believe himself to be aggrieved
by some action of either government which he supposes to be in
violation of the Constitution, and his complaint admit of judicial
investigation, he must be heard upon that question, and it must
be adjudicated, or there can be no administration of the laws
worthy of the name of justice."
It is said by Mr. justice Brewer in ldler v. Oregan. 208 U. S.,
420: "Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled by even
a consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar value
of a written Constitution that it places in unchanging form limita-
tions upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence and
stability to popular government which otherwise would be lack-
ing."
The most serious aspect of the present agitation is not in its
immediate results, but in the tendency towards ever increasing
and rapidly accelerating demands for further changes in the
direction of impairing the integrity and the independence of the
judiciary.
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It is said that the recall of judges if put into the Constitution
of a State will be seldom used, and the experience of Oregon is
cited as an example.
The test will come, however, in times of great public excite-
ment, when popular resentment is aroused against the enforce-
ment of the law affecting some class of the community.
Already threats have been made to invoke the recall in Califor-
nia to rebuke the judges for enforcing the law. What would
have been the situation during the recent McNamara trial in Cali-
fornia if judicial recall had been in force during that trial?
The McNamaras were on trial it will be remembered for dyna-
miting a newspaper office in Los Angeles, causing the death of
several workmen. Intense feeling was aroused by the trial.
Great numbers of men connected with Labor Unions insisted and
most of them perhaps honestly believed the McNamaras to be
innocent of the alleged crime and to be the victims of an unjust
and malignant persecution in the interest of the capitalistic
classes. The McNamaras ultimately and before the close of the
trial confessed their guilt and thus took the question of their guilt
or innocence at once and forever out of the region of uncertainty.
No amount of testimony, however direct and positive and how-
ever convincing to a jury could possibly have made the guilt of the
defendants absolutely clear to their sympathizers beyond all con-
troversy, so long as the defendants had continued to protest their
innocence. Suppose they had not confessed their guilt, but had
been convicted and sentenced, can we doubt that there would have
been public resentment and public clamor and that judicial recall
would have been promptly invoked to punish the judge who pre-
sided at the trial? Confession of guilt and that alone has vin-
dicated the prosecutor and the judge.
"The appetite grows by what it feeds upon." It is appalling
to think of the extremes to which popular majorities under the
instigation of inflammatory harangues by eloquent or persuasive
orators may be driven.
The right of the minority to be protected in their lives, liberty
and property from the clamor of temporary popular majorities
is absolutely essential to the preservation of our free institutions.
"Half the wrong conclusions at which mankind arrives are
reached by the abuse, of metaphors," is a remark attributed to
Lord Palmerston.
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
"The people never give up their liberties but under some delu-
Sion," said Burke in his speech at the county meeting of Bucks,
Misleading catchwords and specious phrases are a cause of
those delusions under whch people are unconsciously led to give
-up their liberties. The abuse of such catchwords and specious
phrases is quite as potent a cause of wrong conclusions as the
abuse of metaphors.
"Let the people rule; Back to the people" is the slogan. Under
the influence of these phrases, the attack is made upon out courts,
which have heretofore made free government possible and which
have been the essential safeguard of constitutional liberty, If
the independence of the judiciary can be destroyed and if respect
for the courts and the law can be undermined, then can the
clamor of the majority be substituted for the rights of the minor-
ity and popular government based upon Constitutional limitations
is at an end.
The misleading effect of catchwords and phrases is well illus-
trated in the matter of presidential primaries. The avowed
object of these primaries was to get rid of the "bosses" and to
enable the people to express their choice of candidates directly and
without the interference of costly and cumbersome convention
machinery. Yet has there ever been a more extraordinary
exhibition of the squandering of money since the foundation of
the Republic than we have seen in the presidential primaries of
this year of grace 1912, in the endeavor to let the people rule?
What chance, let us ask, would Lincoln, a poor country lawyer,
have stood, if he had been compelled to open headquarters, to
publish and distribute tons upon tons of campaign literature, to
hire special trains, to pay hotel bills for himself and his cohorts,
and to travel thousands of miles at his own expense or the expense
of his supporters? The cold fact is, and there is no use in blink-
ing at the fact, that no man can be a candidate for the presidential
nomination to-day, who is not either a man of independent for-
tune, or a man who has supporters ready and willing to furnish
pecuniary assistance. It is no exaggeration to say that money
has been poured out like water in this campaign, not to buy votes,
but to enlighten the voters as to the merits and demerits of the
candidates. And all this before the national conventions have
been held and before the expenses of the presidential nominees of
the various parties have begun. Who would have financed the
campaign expenses of the country lawyer, Lincoln, in a presiden-
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tial primary, and what show would he have had as against Seward
or Chase? I am not blind to the defects and dangers of our
system of party conventions as heretofore carried on, but in
undertaking the radical changes embodied in presidential prima-
ries, are we not jumping from the "frying-pan into the fire?"
What I am particularly desirous of pointing out is the danger
of catch-words and phrases. "Back to the people" as applied to
the judiciary by recall of judges and recall of judicial decisions
means "back to disorder and injustice" and death to constitutiohlal
liberty.
Fortunately, each State must determine for itself whether or
not there shall be a recall of judges or a recall of judicial decisions
by popular vote.
Wild vagaries of faddists and theorists may be indulged in by
one or more of our States without breaking down the safeguards
of our sister States. This is the greatest advantage of our Federal
form of government.
I appeal to you. gentlemen, as you go forth to practice law in
your various States that you do what in you lies to prevent the
spread of these heresies in your several States.
Remember that the independence of the judiciary is the key-
stone of our form of government,--that if the keystone is removed
the whole structure is in danger of disintegration and destruction.
Remember that the safeguards of the Constitution must be pre-
served intact and the right and duty of the judiciary to protect
and enforce the Constitution of State and Nation must be
sedulously and carefully maintained or the day will surely come
when might shall take the place of right and when the government
of the whole people, by the whole people and for the whole people
shall be supplanted by government of the whole people by a
majority of the voters for a majority of the voters. Then will
government of law and order come to an end.
I do not believe that that day will ever come. I am a strong
believer in the common sense of the common people. I believe
that the rash experiments of those of our States who have adopted
this revolutionary constitutional change in their judicial system
known as "judicial recall" will not be followed by their sister
States, and that these States 'themselves will come to see the error
of their ways and will change back to the safe paths of their
ancestors.
William B. Hornblower.
